GREEN DOT CORPORATION
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(Name of Registrant as Specified in Its Charter)
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HARVEST CAPITAL STRATEGIES LLC
HARVEST SMALL CAP PARTNERS MASTER, LTD
HARVEST SMALL CAP PARTNERS, LP
HSCP STRATEGIC I, LP
HARVEST FINANCIAL PARTNERS, LP
JEFFREY B. OSHER
DONALD DESTINO
CRAIG BAUM
SATURNINO FANLO
GEORGE W. GRESHAM
PHILIP B. LIVINGSTON
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(Name of Persons(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if Other Than the Registrant)
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(3)
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Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):
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Green Dot states that Mr. Fanlo was “sued in U.S. Federal Court” by shareholders. Green Dot fails to mention this was a generic shareholder complaint, filed in 2009 against a Mortgage REIT at the depths of the financial crisis, and it was subsequently dismissed. Green Dot also fails to disclose that Mr. Fanlo was one of sixteen named defendants, a list which included the former Chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo, the former Chairperson for the Council of Economic Advisors and current Dean of Columbia Business School, the current COO of Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, and the current head of KKR’s Global Capital Markets and Asset Management Group. Further, we find it ironic that the Green Dot Board would assert that a shareholder complaint makes Mr. Fanlo unsuitable to serve as a director, considering Mr. Streit was sued not once, but TWICE, by shareholders in United States District Courts for claims that he violated Federal Securities Laws. Mr. Streit was unsurprisingly accused of making “false and/or misleading statements [that] had the cause and effect of creating in the market an unrealistically positive assessment of the Company and its financial well-being and prospects.”1
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Green Dot cites anonymous sources in an attempt to disparage Mr. Fanlo’s character. Harvest chose to contact a real person, Tracy L. Collins, who served on KKR Financial’s Board of Directors from 2006-2014 to comment on Mr. Fanlo. Ms. Collins wrote to Harvest, “Nino guided KKR Financial through historically difficult economic times. The higher quality portfolio and the depth of his team he built around him allowed the company to not just survive, but to recover, when so many others pursuing similar strategies failed.”
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Green Dot alludes to “two lawsuits” involving Phil Livingston. Green Dot fails to disclose that these lawsuits are redundant, name six different defendants, and represent generic proxy contest litigation. We find it ironic that Green Dot’s Board would attack Harvest’s nominees for generic business litigation considering a third party investigation found Kenneth Aldrich, Green Dot’s Lead Independent Director and Chair of both the Compensation and Nominating and Corporate Governance Committees, has been associated with at least FOURTEEN lawsuits.
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Green Dot asserts Mr. Livingston is not the COO of UASUSA, citing an anonymous “press spokesperson.” Aside from attempting to undermine Mr. Livingston, it is unclear why Green Dot would make such a specious allegation. Mr. Livingston’s signed and accepted employment letter with UASUSA unequivocally states, “UASUSA is pleased to offer you the position of Chief Operating Officer. You will be responsible for marketing, sales, finance, administration and operations.” Harvest has posted the relevant section of Mr. Livingston’s employment letter as well as his UASUSA business card to www.fixgdot.com.
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Green Dot questions Mr. Livingston’s status as a CPA. As Green Dot should be well aware, Mr. Livingston elected not to renew his CPA license in California and as a result it expired after 21 years. Harvest’s proxy materials have never claimed Mr. Livingston is a currently licensed CPA. This silly attack on Mr. Livingston is again ironic, considering in Green Dot’s proxy solicitation materials, the Company states that Audit Committee Chairman, Timothy Greenleaf, is a tax attorney while conveniently omitting that he has maintained an “inactive” license and has not been permitted to practice law in California for almost a decade.2 Harvest has factually documented Mr. Greenleaf’s Board-related shortcomings in our presentations, but had previously chosen not to focus on the deeply concerning fact that an appellate court found Mr. Greenleaf, while serving as a tax attorney, had engaged in “intentionally misleading conduct” and was accused of “altering [a document] in a deceptive manner” and burying the modifications.3 Harvest believes this type of behavior from Mr. Greenleaf, which does not appear to be isolated, is inappropriate for an Audit Committee Chair, especially at a company as highly regulated and politically sensitive as Green Dot. Harvest will refrain from sharing any additional concerns about Mr. Greenleaf outside of his performance as a Green Dot director, which we believe speaks for itself.
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Regarding Mr. Livingston’s role as CEO of Ambassadors Group, Green Dot fails to highlight that he was tasked by dissident shareholders to either turn around a broken business, whose stock had declined by approximately 90% prior to his arrival, or pursue strategic alternatives. Mr. Livingston determined that dissolving the broken business and distributing excess cash was in the best interests of shareholders, which shareholders supported with 99.9% of votes “FOR” this proposal.4 In addition to distorting the facts, Green Dot includes a fictitious stock chart in its presentation that overstates Ambassadors Group’s stock price decline by using an end value of $1.75, when $2.85 was distributed to shareholders at dissolution.5
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In its unprofessional and desperate attack on Mr. Livingston, Green Dot creatively distorts and cites completely out of context social media posts in a manner that is nothing short of appalling. Mr. Livingston, like tens-of-millions of consumers, has used social media to shine a spotlight on poor customer service. He also highlighted the need for increased diversity in law enforcement and in the entertainment industry. His comments called for more media attention on topics such as police violence against African-Americans. For Green Dot to impugn Mr. Livingston’s character based on manipulated, out of context social media snippets, is unconscionable considering his outstanding character and reputation as a high integrity, shareholder-focused operator. As Green Dot’s largest shareholder, Harvest is disappointed that the Board would approve such distasteful and erroneous representations of Mr. Livingston.
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Relating to Mr. Livingston’s professional qualifications, we would simply point investors to his impressive track record in operations across a diverse set of industries, which includes significant finance and accounting credentials, as well as experience in executive transitions. Mr. Livingston served as Chief Financial Officer for Celestial Seasonings, Inc., Catalina Marketing Corporation and World Wrestling Entertainment, as well as the Chairman of multiple public company Audit Committees. He was the President of Financial Executives International, one of the leading professional associations of chief financial officers and controllers, and he also served on the Advisory Board of Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Advisory Board of International Accounting Standards Board. Mr. Livingston is a current member of the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA). His credentials and integrity speak for themselves.
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Green Dot stated that it offered to appoint George Gresham directly to the Board “in an effort to help settle the proxy contest.” First, George Gresham is an outstanding director nominee, which seems indisputable considering Green Dot recruited Mr. Gresham for its previously vacant CFO role and to join its Board. However, to be unmistakably clear, Green Dot never negotiated with Harvest for a settlement involving Mr. Gresham. To the contrary, Green Dot approached Mr. Gresham duplicitously, without Harvest’s knowledge, in an effort to remove him from our slate. After Mr. Gresham respectfully declined Green Dot’s direct overture intended to undermine Harvest’s campaign, the Board unilaterally appointed three new directors without a shareholder vote.
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Green Dot calls Mr. Gresham “an architect of NetSpend’s overdraft fee plan that is now the subject of pending regulation.” Setting aside the absurdity of Green Dot’s characterizations about NetSpend and overdraft in general, their statement is factually incorrect. The NetSpend overdraft plan was in place and operating when Mr. Gresham joined NetSpend in May 2010 and he played no role in its design or implementation.
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1)
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A lofty IPO valuation
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Increased competition, loss of exclusivity at major retail partners, and tightened risk controls
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Forced MoneyCard price reductions by Walmart, and
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The carefully planned and executed removal of MoneyPak
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1)
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By blaming Green Dot’s stock price decline on “a lofty IPO valuation,” Mr. Streit is effectively stating that management and its investment bankers overpriced its IPO at $36.00 and then further overpriced its secondary offering at $61.00. Insiders sold approximately $425 million of stock across the two offerings.
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2)
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Nearly every company in America faces competition. As we have previously argued, good management teams proactively anticipate and prepare for competition. NetSpend sure did. Implying that Green Dot warned investors about increased competition is an excuse that provided minimal comfort to long-term shareholders and sell-side analysts who endured a 61% single day stock price decline. Even more perverse, Mr. Streit is now attempting to re-write history portraying himself as a savior for notifying shareholders that Green Dot had lost all-important retail exclusivity, when in fact he had previously downplayed the importance of such exclusivity. Consider the Company’s comments before and after Green Dot’s Q2’12 earnings call:
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ORIGINAL: 10/27/11 – “I think what’s probably most important to note is that not all of our retailers are exclusive, nor have they ever all been exclusive. And yet, even in the ones where we’re not contractually exclusive, it’s common and typical that they would still sell only our products anyhow.”
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REVISION: 11/14/12 – “If we looked back about 12 months, four of our top five retail distribution partners were exclusive, governed by long-term contracts, and now today, really only one of those top five are still exclusive.”
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We believe Mr. Streit’s accusatory comments towards Walmart are symptomatic of his toxic management style, which Harvest has documented at length. Rather than accept responsibility for a poor strategic decision, Mr. Streit publicly denigrated his most important customer. Aside from Mr. Streit blaming Green Dot’s largest customer for unsatisfactory changes to MoneyCard, it is fair to ask “If Mr. Streit did not believe lower MoneyCard prices would stimulate card usage and lead to greater overall revenue, why did he explicitly communicate this expectation to investors?”
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10/31/13 – “We believe that the breadth of these new [MoneyCard] offerings, together with the wider variety of value based pricing plans and the more substantial in-store placement designed to showcase these new products, presents the opportunity for increased revenue and expanded margins going forward.”
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4)
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In Harvest’s presentations, we meticulously detail why we believe Mr. Streit’s removal of MoneyPak, while a sound long-term strategy, was poorly executed, hastily implemented, and inaccurately communicated to both the retail distribution channel and shareholders. Mr. Streit’s suggestion that he spent months carefully planning and analyzing the removal of MoneyPak is preposterous, and flies in the face of his original guidance to investors that MoneyPak was “not really a material driver of revenue and a less material driver of EBITDA,” which of course preceded MoneyPak expectations being negatively revised in every quarter of 2015.6
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In 2012, Green Dot purchased eCommLink with the stated goal, which Harvest supported, of transitioning processing in-house. We believe Green Dot spent at least $10 million annually on this project. In 2015, Mr. Streit abandoned the Company’s long-term in-house processing strategy.
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In 2012, Green Dot spent $43 million to purchase Loopt. This was a dilutive related party transaction, as Sequoia Capital was the largest shareholder of both companies and held seats on both boards. The acquisition was originally portrayed as a revenue generator, “while we’re still in the early stages of integration and our assumptions could change, we expect the Loopt acquisition to be accretive beginning in 2013.”8 Now, Mr. Streit is attempting to recast the deal as a cost saving transaction, “[Loopt] is driving millions of dollars of savings in 2016.”
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In 2014, Green Dot spent $320 million in cash and stock to purchase Santa Barbara Tax Products Group (“TPG”).9 The transaction was poorly structured, with Green Dot issuing 6.1 million undervalued shares when low cost debt was available. Since the transaction closed, TPG revenue has been consistently revised lower and Mr. Streit has not delivered on promised revenue synergies.
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In late 2014 and early 2015, Green Dot spent $87 million to acquire Achieve Card and AccountNow.10 Mr. Streit initially withheld disclosing both acquisitions to investors, while claiming the revenue contributions were organic. Only after a 25% two-day stock price decline and significant confusion reconciling management’s 2015 guidance did the Company disclose these two companies would account for more than 10% of projected revenue.
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Contrary to Green Dot’s statement, Harvest took no liberties in defining Green Dot’s peer group. We utilized the Board’s self-selected peer group as defined in the Company’s 2014 Proxy Statement (“Original Peer Group”) and 2015 Proxy Statement (“Revised Peer Group”).
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Green Dot is now stating the Board’s self-selected peer group from 2014 and 2015, which Harvest used in our analysis, “does not accurately portray” its peers.
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In its presentation, the Board is including the significant year-to-date Harvest-affected price increase when analyzing Green Dot’s relative and overall performance.
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Over the last one, two, and five year periods ending 12/31/15, Green Dot underperformed its original self-selected Peer Group by 31%, 53%, and 274%, respectively, while underperforming its revised peer group by 18%, 33%, and 184%, respectively.11
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Green Dot’s stock price declined 71% in the five years ending 12/31/15.
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Tax Products Group Continues to Underperform: When Green Dot announced its acquisition of TPG, Mr. Streit emphasized revenue synergies could be realized in 2016 by cross-selling Green Dot prepaid cards to TPG tax refund customers. After TPG revenue declined by 20% in 2015,13 Mr. Streit assured investors this type of performance was not a trend and he was confident the Company was in position to re-acquire lost revenue in 2016 as revenue synergies were realized. As recently as November 2015, Mr. Streit stated, “We’re pleased to let you know that our goal of generating revenue synergies from the TPG acquisition is expected to begin to play out in 2016.” On the Q1’16 conference call, Mr. Streit admitted revenue from TPG, which had already declined materially in 2015, will remain flat in 2016.
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TPG CEO Resigned or was Terminated: We believe the CEO of TPG, Bill Maher, either resigned or was terminated. While Mr. Streit alludes to potential disruption if he is removed as CEO, Harvest would point out that Mr. Maher would mark at least the 10th senior executive to depart from Green Dot in the last few years.
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Walmart Revenue Decline Re-Accelerated: After Green Dot’s 2013 MoneyCard refresh failed to spur growth, which Mr. Streit is now blaming on Walmart, the Company rolled out a new suite of products in February, 2016. How have customers responded? Walmart revenue declined by 10% in Q1’16, which is a negative reacceleration from the 2% decline in Q4’15.
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Recent Uber “Win” May be a Loss for Shareholders: Mr. Streit promoted an expanded partnership with Uber whereby Green Dot will extend “Instant Pay” functionality to debit cards issued by any bank. Based on our research, we believe this new “win” was due to negative feedback and limited adoption in the original Uber GoBank pilot. Now, Uber drivers who already have a bank account have the option to receive “Instant Pay” into their current account, which eliminates the need for a GoBank account.
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Green Dot’s Expense Structure Continues to Grow: In Green Dot’s April 18, 2016 letter to shareholders, the Company stated that $13 million of cost savings were achieved in 2015 and management expects millions more in savings in 2016. We are unclear where these savings accrued considering compensation & benefits and general & administrative expenses grew $77 million, or 34% in 2015.14 These expense lines grew another 5% year-over-year in Q1’16 despite revenue declining.
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Revenue per Card Growth Due to Retroactive Monthly Fee Increase: While Mr. Streit stated Q1’16 results did not benefit from Green Dot’s new products, he chose to withhold disclosing that Green Dot raised monthly fees on its existing portfolio, which we believe significantly aided Q1’16 results. Based on fee increases on our Green Dot cards and comments on Consumer Affairs’ website, we believe Green Dot began selectively raising monthly fees on Green Dot branded products in December 2015. While we believe Green Dot sent emails to customers notifying them of the price increase, consumer complaints suggest their strategy should have been better communicated. One complaint from March 2016 states, “I have been with GREENDOT for over 8 years now! I go to check on my balance on my card and notice that they had been charging me 7.95 a month to my card without any knowledge of anything, not even a letter in the mail to let me know that they will be charging me this now every month, instead of the 3.95 that I had knowledge of knowing when I got the card!”15
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